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We study the security of quantum string commitment (QSC) protocols with group covariant
encoding scheme. First we consider a class of QSC protocol, which is general enough to incorporate
all the QSC protocols given in the preceding literatures. Then among those protocols, we consider
group covariant protocols and show that the exact upperbound on the binding condition can be
calculated. Next using this result, we prove that for every irreducible representation of a finite
group, there always exists a corresponding nontrivial QSC protocol which reaches a level of security
impossible to achieve classically.
PACS number(s): 03.65.-a, 03.67.Dd, 89.70.+c
I. INTRODUCTION
Commitment is an important building block of clas-
sical cryptographic protocols. Informally, commitment
protocols in general provide the function of a safe or
envelope that can be exchanged over a communication
channel; first the sender Alice sends an evidence of data
x of her choice to the receiver Bob without revealing x
itself. After some time Alice will reveal x, and then Bob
can verify that it is indeed the original value of x that
she chose by inspecting the evidence received before.
With the help of computational intractability assump-
tions, such task can easily be realized, in such a way
that the secrecy of x against Bob and the unchangeability
(the binding condition) of x by Alice are both perfectly
fulfilled[1]. However, when it comes to the construction
of unconditionally secure protocols, things change dras-
tically. It was proved by Lo and Chau[2], and also by
Mayers independently[3], that such a protocol with per-
fect secrecy and binding, or the so-called bit commitment
(BC), is in fact impossible even by quantum protocols.
Among many attempts to circumvent this no-go the-
orem, we focus here on quantum string commitment, or
QSC for short[4, 5, 6]. In QSC protocols, the sender is
supposed to commit n > 1 bits of data in a single session
of protocol, and we are no more interested in fulfilling
both the secrecy and the binding conditions perfectly.
Instead we study a trade-off between the two conditions.
In general, partial information about x, say b bits, may
be accessible to Bob prior to the reveal phase, and on
the contrary, Alice may be able to change a bits after
the commitment phase. Still, as long as a+ b < n, such
a scheme provides a nontrivial quantum cryptographic
protocol in that it reaches a classically impossible level
of security. Indeed a number of protocols have been ob-
tained that are nontrivial in this sense[4, 5, 6].
In this paper, we consider QSC protocols which have
group covariant commitment state ρx’s and study its se-
curity in terms of the security criteria given by Buhrman
et al.[6]. First we consider a class of QSC protocols,
which is general enough to incorporate all the QSC proto-
cols defined explicitly in the preceding literatures. Then
we show that if the encoding scheme for such protocol is
covariant under an irreducible representation of a group
G, one can calculate the exact upper bound on its bind-
ing condition. Next combining this result with the well-
known theorems for quantum optimum detection prob-
lem with covariant input states, we prove that for every
irreducible representation of a finite group G, there al-
ways exists a nontrivial QSC protocol. In other words,
we demonstrate how to construct infinitely many types
of nontrivial QSC protocols with a+ b < n.
II. QUANTUM STRING COMMITMENT
A. Description of Protocol
A quantum string commitment (QSC) protocol is a
quantum communication protocol between two parties,
the sender Alice and the receiver Bob, which consists of
two stages, the commit phase and the reveal phase.
• (Commit Phase) If both parties are honest, Alice
chooses a string x ∈ {0, 1}n. From Bob’s point
of view, string x has probability px. Alice and Bob
communicate. Let ρx denote Bob’s state at the end
of the protocol if Alice committed string x.
• (Reveal Phase) If both parties are honest, Alice
sends x and other reveal information to Bob. Bob
accepts.
In addition, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that
honest Alice chooses x ∈ {0, 1}n with a uniform distri-
bution px = 2
−n.
B. Security Requirements
As was the case for bit commitment, there are two con-
ditions of security for quantum string commitment, that
2is, the secrecy condition and the binding condition. While
there are various ways of defining them[4, 5, 6], especially
for binding, in this paper we use the most simple of them
given in Ref.[6], based on accessible information Iacc.
The concealing condition, or the secrecy, deals with
cases where Alice is honest. Malicious Bob in general
does anything possible to obtain information regarding
x prior to the reveal phase, and in order to discuss the
security there, we want to bound the amount of his in-
formation from above. The relevant quantity for such
purpose is the accessible information Iacc for the ensem-
ble of commitment states E = {px, ρx}.
Definition 1 (Concealing Condition) A QSC proto-
col is b-concealing if Iacc(E) ≤ b. Here Iacc(E) is Bob’s
accessible information measured at the end of the commit
phase.
As pointed out by Buhrman et al.[6], the stronger notion
of Holevo Information χ is not appropriate for this pur-
pose since in many cases χ overestimates Iacc and can set
b larger than the reality.
On the other hand, the binding condition applies when
Bob is honest. It is possible that malicious Alice may
postpone her decision on the value of x until after the
commit phase, and try to reveal one of several different
values of x at the reveal phase. In order to limit Alice’s
attack of this type, we employ the following security cri-
terion.
Definition 2 (Binding Condition) A QSC protocol is
a-binding if
∑
x∈{0,1}n p˜x ≤ 2a, where p˜x is the probabil-
ity that Alice is able to successfully reveal x ∈ {0, 1}n at
the reveal phase.
For purely classical protocol without any special assump-
tion, such as computational intractability or relativis-
tic constraints, a + b ≥ n always holds. This can be
shown in a similar way to the proof of the impossibility
of information-theoretically secure bit commitment[11].
Hence, as long as a + b < n is satisfied, we consider a
quantum protocol to be nontrivial.
III. GROUP COVARIANT PROTOCOL
A. Basic Scheme
1. Description
From now on, we restrict ourselves to the following
type of QSC protocols. This scheme allows us to con-
vert an arbitrary ensemble of states E = {px, ρx} to a
corresponding QSC protocol in a straightforward way.
Moreover, as will be shown below, it is general enough
to incorporate all previous QSC protocols appearing in
preceding literatures[4, 5, 6] without sacrificing security.
• (Commit Phase) Honest Alice generates a state vec-
tor |ψx〉 ∈ HA ⊗ HB, which depends on the value
of x she chooses, and sends its second half (in HB)
to Bob.
• (Reveal Phase) Alice sends to Bob the remaining
half of her state. Honest Bob measures it projec-
tively with respect to |ψx〉, and outputs ACCEPT
if and only if the outcome is correct.
Bob’s view at the end of the commit phase is of course
ρx = TrA|ψx〉〈ψx|. Thus according to Definion 1, the
secrecy is measured by the accessible information Iacc(E)
for the ensemble E := {px, ρx}.
2. Binding Condition
For the above scheme, Alice’s cheating strategy can
always be formulated as follows. As in the proof of the
no-go theorem of quantum BC[2, 3], it is convenient to
adopt the decoherence point of view by introducing a suit-
able environment Hilbert space. Then without loss of
generality, we may assume that the state shared between
two parties at the end of the commit phase is a pure state
|Ψ〉 ∈ HA˜⊗HB. Here the dimension of HA˜ is assumed to
be arbitrary, say dA˜. Subsequently in reveal phase, Alice
performs generalized quantum operations[7] on HA˜,
Ox := {Exi | i = 1, . . . ,m}, (1)
m∑
i=1
E†xiExi = IdA˜ ,
which depend on the value of x that she wishes to reveal,
and sends the obtained quantum state to Bob. Quantum
operation Ox yields classical outcome i with probability
qxi := TrA˜B
[
Exi|Ψ〉〈Ψ|E†xi
]
,
as a result of which Bob obtains Exi|Ψ〉〈Ψ|E†xi/qxi. Bob
then measures it projectively with respect to |ψx〉, and
accepts x with probability p˜x =
∑
i |〈ψx|Exi|Ψ〉|2. Hence
the binding condition is measured by∑
x
p˜x ≤ max
Ψ
∑
x
max
Ox
∑
i
|〈ψx|Exi|Ψ〉|2 . (2)
3. Relation to The Existing Protocols.
Here we show that all previous QSC protocols appear-
ing in preceding literatures[4, 5, 6] can be converted to
our basic scheme without sacrificing security.
This is trivial for those protocols defined in Ref.[4, 5],
where honest Alice sends to Bob a pure state which is
not entangled with any of her state. In this case HA is
considered as a one-dimensional vector space.
The conversion is also possible for LOCKCOM -type
QSC protocols[6], where the sender is supposed to choose
random number i ∈ {1, . . . , R} besides x, and send Ui|x〉
3in commit phase, with Ui being a unitary operator. For
such protocols, one simply needs to choose |ψx〉 for the
converted protocol as
|ψx〉 := 1√
R
∑
i
|i〉A ⊗ Ui|x〉B .
This is a purification of ρx of the original protocol,
i.e., ρx =
1
R
∑R
i=1 Ui|x〉BB〈x|U †i and ρx = Tr|ψx〉〈ψx|.
Clearly, secrecy is not changed with such conversion.
Binding can also be guaranteed due to the following ar-
gument; In the reveal phase of the original protocol, Bob
uses an operator
P =
∑
i
|i〉AA〈i| ⊗ Ui|x〉BB〈x|U †i
to test the state obtained, while for the converted version
P˜ = |ψx〉〈ψx| is used. P and P˜ are projection operators
commuting with each other and P˜ is of smaller rank.
Thus any strategy by Alice for the converted protocol
will always give an equal or higher success probability
when applied to the original protocol.
B. Group Covariant Protocols
If we restrict ourselves to group covariant protocols, to
be defined shortly, we can in fact calculate the maximum
value of
∑
x p˜x exactly. This is because, as we will show
below, any cheating strategy by malicious Alice is equiv-
alent to choosing |Ψ〉 of Eqn.(2) such that ρ = TrA|Ψ〉〈Ψ|
is a group invariant state. Especially when a protocol is
invariant under an irreducible representation of group G,
it means that ρ must be proportional to unit vector Id
and this fact greatly simplifies calculations.
1. Irreducible Representation
As a preliminary to this result, we introduce some ter-
minology of group theory [8]. Representation D of a
group G is a set of matrices {D(g) | g ∈ G }, satisfying
∀g1, ∀g2 ∈ G, D(g1)D(g2) = D(g1g2). In what follows we
suppose that D(g)’s are d×d unitary matrices operating
on d-dimensional vector space HB . Representation D is
irreducible when no nontrivial vector subspace of HB is
invariant under G. It is a direct consequence of Shur’s
lemma that for irreducible D, a d × d matrix M com-
mutes with D(g), ∀g ∈ G iff M is proportional to the
unit matrix Id.
Bob’s view { ρx |x ∈ {0, 1}n }, which we introduced
above, is called covariant if it is invariant as a set under
operations of G. In other words,
∀x, ∀g ∈ G, ∃y, ρy = D(g)ρxD†(g). (3)
The action of G on a covariant set {ρx} is called transitive
if for all x and y there exists g ∈ G such that ρy =
D(g)ρxD
†(g).
In the rest of this paper, we will refer to a QSC proto-
col as group covariant protocol if it possesses ρx’s trans-
forming covariantly and transitively under an irreducible
representation of a finite group G.
2. Symmetrized Strategy
Using the above notations, we shall show that any
strategy used by a malicious Alice can always be con-
verted into an equally effective form in which she com-
mits a symmetric state.
As explained in the paragraph around Eqn.(1), Alice’s
cheating strategy can always be characterized by state
|Ψ〉 ∈ HA˜ ⊗HB that she generates during commit phase
and the set of quantum operations given in Eqn.(1). The
first key observation is that instead of using |Ψ〉, she may
as well introduce an ancillary Hilbert space HA′ and gen-
erate
|Φ〉A′A˜B =
1√|G|
∑
g∈G
|g〉A′ ⊗DB(g)|Ψ〉A˜B ,
with DB(g) acting on HB. The set of states {|g〉A′}g∈G
form an orthogonal basis labeled by G, 〈g|g′〉A′ = δg,g′ .
With such |Φ〉, Alice can achieve a value of ∑x p˜x at
least equal to the original attack, e.g., by first measuring
|g〉A′ in the reveal phase, and then operating on HA˜ with
Ox with a permuted value of x. Note that in this case
DB(g) merely permutes the values of p˜x and the sum of
p˜x remains unchanged.
On the other hand, |Φ〉 as seen from Bob, or σ :=
TrA′,A˜|Φ〉〈Φ|, is clearly invariant under G, meaning that
it must be proportional to the unit matrix, σ = Id/d.
Hence Alice’s best strategy during commit phase is to
send Bob the maximally entangled state
|ΦME〉 := 1√
d
d∑
a=1
|a〉A ⊗ |a〉B .
Subsequently in reveal phase, Alice’s operations in gen-
eral can be described, as in the original attack, by a set
of operators Ox, as defined in Eqn.(1), although the ac-
tual form of Ox’s achieving the maximum
∑
x p˜x may not
be the same as those used in the original attack. Hence
without loss of generality, we may assume p˜x takes the
form
p˜x = max
Ox
m∑
i=1
|〈ψx|Exi|ΦME〉|2 .
It is easy to see that due to the symmetry properties of
our protocol, the maxima of p˜x’s are all equal for any
value of x. Thus it remains to maximize p˜x for an arbi-
trarily chosen value of x, say p˜0.
43. Maximizing p˜0
Recall that |ΦME〉 is invariant under UA ⊗ UB with
UA being an arbitrary unitary transformation and UB
its complex conjugate. Thus by appropriate choice of or-
thonormal bases {|µa〉} and {|νa〉} and using the Schmidt
decomposition, we can rewrite |ΦME〉 and |ψ0〉 as
|ΦME〉 =
∑
a
1√
d
|µa〉A ⊗ |µa〉B,
|ψ0〉 =
∑
a
√
λa|νa〉A ⊗ |µa〉B ,
where λa’s are the eigenvalues of ρ0, and by symmetry,
of all ρx’s. Then by decomposing E0i as
E0i =
∑
a,b
N iab|νa〉〈µa|,
p˜0 can be expressed as
p˜0 =
1
d
∑
i
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
N iaaλ
1/2
a
∣∣∣∣∣
2
with ∑
i
∑
a
(
N iab
)∗
N iac = δbc.
It is convenient to interpret the diagonal elements of
N iab as an m-dimensional vector ~va = (N
1
aa, . . . , N
m
aa).
The lengths of ~va’s are smaller than one since |~va|2 ≤∑
i
∑
b |N iba|2 = 1. With this property, p˜0 can be
bounded from above as
p˜0 =
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
λ1/2a ~va
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ 1
d
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
λ1/2a
∣∣∣∣∣
2
max
a
|~va|2
≤ 1
d
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
λ1/2a
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
with the equality holding for m = 1 and N1ab = δab.
Summarizing the above, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Exact Upperbound on Binding) For
a group covariant QSC protocol, and λa’s being the
eigenvalues of ρx,
∑
x
p˜x ≤ 2
n
d
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
a
λ1/2a
∣∣∣∣∣
2
(4)
with the equality holding for Alice’s attack using the max-
imally entangled state.
In terms of Renyi entropy Sα, Eqn.(4) can be rewritten
in a form similar to Theorem 2 of Ref.[6]:
log
(∑
x
p˜x
)
≤ n− [S(ρ)− S1/2(ρ0)] , (5)
where S1/2(·) denotes Renyi entropy for α = 1/2. The
mixed state ρ is defined as ρ =
∑
x pxρx = I/d.
C. Example: Tetrahedral Encoding
As an application of Theorem 1, we consider ρx’s co-
variant under the tetrahedral group[8].
Define qubit states
|ξ; 00〉 =
(
1
0
)
, |ξ; 01〉 =
( √
1/3√
2/3
)
,
|ξ; 10〉 =
( √
1/3√
2/3ω
)
, |ξ; 11〉 =
( √
1/3√
2/3ω2
)
with ω = e2pii/3. These four states are covariant under
an irreducible representation of the tetrahedral group T ,
which we will denote asD(g), for g ∈ T [12]. Now assume
that n is an even number. Also define |ψx〉 ∈ HB as
|ψx〉 := |ξ;x1x2〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ξ;xn−1xn〉.
and let HA be a one-dimensional complex vector state.
That is, honest Alice is supposed to send Bob pure state
|ψx〉 in commit phase.
Such ρx’s are covariant under G := T ×· · ·×T with its
irreducible representation D(g1) ⊗ · · · ⊗ D(gn/2). Thus
applying Theorem 1 obtained above, we readily find the
exact upper bound on binding;
∑
x p˜x ≤ 2n/2. In other
words, this protocol is n/2-binding.
Secrecy can also be calculated exactly. Alice’s com-
mitment is n/2 independent draws of an ensemble E =
{pi = 14 , |ξ; i〉} with i = 1, . . . , 4, and the accessible infor-
mation for such case is known to be additive, Iacc(E⊗ n2 ) =
n
2
Iacc(E) [9, 10]. Due to this fact and by using the exact
value Iacc(E) = log 43 for the tetrahedral states[8], we find
that this protocol is n
2
log 4
3
-binding.
In summary, we have a = n
2
and b = n
2
log 4
3
satisfying
n > a+ b, which is impossible classically.
IV. SECRECY OF COVARIANT PROTOCOLS
At the end of the previous section, we studied a QSC
protocol transforming covariantly under the tetrahedral
group and it turned out to be nontrivial, that is, a clas-
sically impossible protocol. As we will show below, in
fact this is not a coincidence but rather a consequence of
symmetric properties of our protocols.
In this section, by focusing on the cases where all ρx’s
are pure states, and with the help of the results ob-
tained in the preceding literatures on the information-
theoretic optimum detection problem with covariant in-
put states[8], we will show the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For covariant protocols with pure ρx’s, ei-
ther of the following cases holds:
1. The protocol is equivalent to a purely classical pro-
tocols, i.e., all transactions occurring between Alice
and Bob are done in computational basis.
2. The protocol is nontrivial, i.e., it satisfies a+b < n
with strict inequality.
5Proof of Theorem. As for secrecy, there are useful formula
giving classical mutual information Iacc in a very simple
form. The most relevant among them for our purpose
is Lemma 6 of Ref.[8], which reads in our notation as
follows.
Lemma 1 For a covariant encoding scheme, the maxi-
mum value of accessible information Iacc is given by
Iacc = log d+
d
|G|
∑
g∈G
〈ϕ|ρg|ϕ〉 log〈ϕ|ρg|ϕ〉, (6)
where |ϕ〉 is an appropriately chosen state vector.
Mixed state ρg appearing in (6) is indexed by a group
element g ∈ G and is defined as ρg := D(g)ρ0D†(g),
where ρ0 denotes ρx with x = 0. According to Eqn.(3),
every ρg equals some ρx but the correspondence is not
necessarily one-to-one.
Now note that for pure ρx, the log on the RHS of
Inequality (4) equals n − log d. On the contrary, the
second term on the RHS of (6) is clearly no more than
zero, and so, as long as there is at least one nonzero
element in the sum of (6), the protocol is nontrivial. Thus
it remains to show that a trivial case is always equivalent
to a classical protocol.
Clearly, with ρg being a pure state, 〈ϕ|ρg |ϕ〉 can
be rewritten as 〈ϕ|ρg|ϕ〉 = |〈ϕ|D(g)|ψ0〉|2 with ρ0 =
|ψ0〉〈ψ0|. Then if we suppose that the sum of (6) is
strictly zero, |〈ϕ|D(g)|ψ〉|2 = 0 or 1 should hold for all
g ∈ G. Since this quantity should be nonzero at least
for one group element g ∈ G, without loss of general-
ity we may assume |ϕ〉 = |ψ0〉. Hence we have ∀g ∈ G,
|〈ψ0|D(g)|ψ0〉|2 = 0 or 1. This means that |ψx〉 defined
by ρx = |ψx〉〈ψx| are all orthogonal to each other since
any |ψx〉 can be described as D(g)|ψ0〉 for some g ∈ G
due to irreduciblilty of D. This completes the proof.
By choosing an arbitrary irreducible representation D
of a group G, and with an arbitrary choice of a pure state
vector |ψ〉, we can always construct a QSC protocol that
uses D(g)|ψ〉 as commitment states. Moreover, it is clear
that for any choice of G and D, there always exists |ψ〉,
such that D(g)|ψ〉’s do not form a orthonormal basis, in
which case the obtained QSC protocol is nontrivial due to
this Theorem. Thus we also have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 For any irreducible representation D of any
finite group G, there always exists a nontrivial QSC pro-
tocol with a+ b < n.
V. SUMMARY
In this paper, we introduced a class of QSC protocols
and studied its security in terms of the security criteria
given by Buhrman et al.[6]. In particular, we considered
group covariant protocols and showed how to calculate
the exact upper bound on its binding conditions. Then
combining this result with the previously known theo-
rems for the quantum optimum detection problem, we
proved that for every irreducible representation of a fi-
nite group G, there always exists a nontrivial QSC proto-
col. In other words, we demonstrated how to construct
infinitely many types of nontrivial QSC protocols with
a+ b < n.
A question that arises naturally is for what types
of groups and for which representations we obtain effi-
cient protocols with strong enough security. In particu-
lar, in view of cryptographic applications, such as zero-
knowledge proof or message authentication, a/n and b/n
should be minimized. Although Buhrman et al. have
given a protocol that accomplishes arbitrarily small a/n
and b/n, their protocol is not efficient. On the contrary
for group covariant schemes as given here, the obtained
protocols are most likely efficient. Hence it is interest-
ing to investigate our result for other explicit examples
of finite groups.
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